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The Fear Factor: Privacy, Fear, and the Changing
Hegemony of the American People and the Right to
Privacy
Oliver Ireland* and Rachel Howell**
I. Introduction
Surveys of public opinion tend to show a strong concern for
privacy, particularly with respect to financial information.'
Consumers fear that information about them may be misused by
the government or the private sector.2 But, as recent events have
made clear, that concern for privacy may be readily subordinated
to other concerns, such as the fight against terrorism and fraud in
the form of the growing crime of identity theft.3
II. Privacy Overview: The Concept of Privacy
Although we often view privacy as a cornerstone of personal
freedom, legal recognition of a right to privacy in the United
States is uneven and demonstrates a willingness to subordinate
privacy interests to other policy interests.4 For example, there is no
* Oliver Ireland is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Morrison & Foerster LLP,
where his practice focuses on financial services and privacy. Prior to joining Morrison
& Foerster LLP, Mr. Ireland was Associate General Counsel of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.
- Rachel Howell is an associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Morrison & Foerster
LLP, where her practice focuses on financial services and privacy.
I See, e.g., Electronic Privacy Information Center, Public Opinion on Privacy, at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/survey (last updated June 25, 2003) (detailing the results of
a number of public opinion surveys related to various aspects of privacy).
2 Id.
3 See Anita L. Allen, Privacy Isn 't Everything: Accountability as a Personal and
Social Good, 2003 Daniel J. Meador Lecture (Feb. 4, 2003), in 54 ALA. L. REv. 1375,
1375-76 (2003).
4 See, e.g., Jeffery A. Lowe, Big Brother Will Be Watching: LifeLog Project Up
Administration's Sleeve Threatens Privacy Rights of Every American, L.A. DAILY J.,
July 31, 2003, at 6 (discussing the possible ramifications of the Bush administration's
new LifeLog computer surveillance system on individual privacy).
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express "right to privacy" set forth in the Constitution.5
Nevertheless, in the 1965 landmark case Griswold v. Connecticut,
6
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut law banning
birth control, basing its decision on a zone of privacy created by
several constitutional rights.7 In writing the opinion of the Court,
Justice William 0. Douglas wrote, "specific guarantees in the Bill
of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various
guarantees create zones of privacy."8  Griswold has been cited
since its issuance as one of the foundations of an individual's
"right to privacy." Yet, Justice Potter Stewart, in his Griswold
dissent, stated, "with all deference, I can find no such general right
of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other part of the
Constitution, or in any case ever before decided by this Court."9
As surely as the Supreme Court justices could not agree on a right
to privacy at such a critical time,'" the debate continues as to
where and when the right to privacy exists or is muted by a
competing interest. 1
Similarly, legislative and regulatory treatment of privacy
interests has been erratic.' 2 As this article will demonstrate, despite
5 U.S. CONST; see also David J. Garrow, Privacy and the American Constitution,
68 Soc. RES. 55, 55 (2001) (discussing the absence of an express right to privacy in the
U.S. Constitution).
6 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a state law banning
the sale of contraceptives based on a right to privacy). In addition, the recently enacted
California Financial Information Privacy Act provides more stringent privacy protections
than the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). See California Financial
Information Privacy Act, CAL. FIN. CODE § 4050 et. seq. (1999).
7 Griswold, 381 U.S at 485-86 (reversing the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut).
8 Id. at 484. The Court also notes that neither the right of people to associate nor
the right to educate a child in a school of the parent's choice are mentioned in the
Constitution or the Bill of Rights, but the First Amendment has nevertheless been
construed to include such rights. See id. at 482.
9 Id. at 530 (Black, J., dissenting).
10 Id. at 479-531 (comparing the brief majority opinion with the dissenting
opinions).
11 See, e.g., Lowe, supra note 4, at 6 (discussing the likely subordination of
individual privacy interests in the face of the Bush administration's War on Terror).
12 See Deron H. Brown, Book Note, 22 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 251, 255 (2000)
(reviewing FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1997)).
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an apparent growing concern over financial privacy in particular, it
is difficult to identify a clear public policy trend with respect to the
privacy of consumer financial information.
Unlike some other countries,13 the United States does not have
a comprehensive general privacy statute, but rather focused
privacy laws at both the state and federal levels. 14 For example,
Congress has enacted federal laws related to healthcare privacy,
such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996,15 and consumer financial privacy, such as Title V of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). 16 One of the potential spheres
of privacy with which Americans have been most concerned in
recent years, and thus Congress has been the most active, is the
area of financial privacy. This concern may rest on the fact that
financial records have an increasing potential to reveal the most
information about an individual, among many other things. They
may show: to whom political contributions were made; to where
one has traveled; investments; items purchased; and social causes
and organizations supported.
The rise in concern about financial privacy has correlated
strongly with the development of improved data processing and
communications technologies. The first federal legislation to
address the privacy of consumer financial information was the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) 17 in 1970.
The FCRA was intended to address consumer perception of
13 See, e.g., Council Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 1, 1995 O.J.
(L281) 31, 38 (establishing sweeping privacy requirements for the European Union
member states).
14 See Gregory T. Nojeim, Financial Privacy, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 81, 90
(2000). For a comparison of specific federal legislation with state legislation, see
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809
(2000); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29
U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.); California Financial Information Privacy Act, supra note 6; Privacy
of Consumer Financial and Healthy Information Regulation, VT. CODE R. 21 020 053
(2002).
15 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, supra note 14.
16 The Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L .No. 106-102, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-
6809.
17 The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1970).
2004]
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abusive practices and lack of responsiveness on the part of some
credit bureaus and other entities that collect and disseminate credit
and other personal information. The FCRA created standards for
the collection and maintenance of credit and other consumer
information by consumer reporting agencies. The FCRA also
limits the dissemination of consumer reports to certain
"permissible purposes" 8and otherwise prohibits disclosure of
consumer report information by consumer reporting agencies.
A. The Privacy Act of 1974
Shortly after the enactment of the FCRA, in 1972 then
secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Elliot L. Richardson,
established the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated
Personal Data Systems. The formation of this committee was in
response to growing concerns about the harm that could result
from the unfettered use of computer and telecommunications
technology to collect, store and use data about individual citizens.
The Committee was asked to analyze and make recommendations
about: (1) harmful consequences resulting from using automated
personal data systems; (2) safeguards that might protect against
potentially harmful consequences; (3) measures that might afford
redress for any harmful consequences; and (4) policy and practice
relating to the issuance and use of Social Security numbers.19 The
resulting report, Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens
("HEW Report") is set forth in the Code of Fair Information
Practice, which outlines five fair information privacy principles
that were integrated into the Privacy Act. These principles are still
relied upon as a basis for privacy and information policy and
provided the intellectual foundation2" for the Federal Privacy Act
of 1974 ("Privacy Act"). 21
The Privacy Act regulates information systems maintained by
the federal government. The Privacy Act also created the Privacy
18 See id. § 1681b.
19 Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated
Personal Data Systems, "Records, Computers and Rights of Citizens" Report (1973),
available at http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/datacncll1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm (last
visited Feb. 22, 2004).
20 See ARTHUR A. BusHKrN & SAMUEL I. SCHAEN, THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974: A
REFERENCE MANUAL FOR COMPLIANCE (System Development Corporation 1975).
21 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974).
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Protection Study Commission, which was charged with
investigating and studying privacy protection throughout the
United States and making recommendations for future
legislation.22 As a result, the Privacy Protection Commission
issued a report entitled Personal Privacy in the Information
Society.2
3
B. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978
At about the same time, concerns over privacy increased as the
federal courts issued several decisions that called into question the
privacy of financial records. For example, in California Bankers
Association v. SchUlt, 24 the U.S Supreme Court upheld the Bank
Secrecy Act25 against challenges by the American Civil Liberties
Union and the California Bankers Association that its
recordkeeping requirements infringed upon a constitutional right
to privacy. The Bank Secrecy Act requires financial institutions to
keep records of certain financial transactions including making
and retaining microfilm copies of all checks over a certain dollar
amount.26 Due to the impracticality of sorting checks for copying
by the dollar amount, many banks were copying all checks. Just
two years later in United States v. Miller,27 the Supreme Court held
that a bank customer does not have a constitutionally protected
right of privacy in bank account records; thus, a bank customer
lacks standing to challenge, on Fourth Amendment grounds, a
bank's disclosure to federal authorities. On the same day as
Miller, the Supreme Court decided Fisher v. United States, 28
which held that an individual has no Fifth Amendment right
against compelled self-incrimination that would entitle him to
prevent his attorney from producing financial records made by the
22 See id. at §§ 1905-1909.
23 Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information
Society Report (1977), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report (last
visited Mar. 22, 2004).
24 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
25 The Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 11/4 (1970) (codified and
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959; 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5355).
26 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d).
27 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
28 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
2004]
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individual's accountant when summoned by the I.R.S. In so
holding, the Court reasoned that where records are developed by a
third party as a result of an ordinary business relationship, the
subject has no constitutionally protected right of privacy in those
records.
Congress responded to the Court with what would become the
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (RFPA).29  Legislative
history indicates that the bill that was to become the RFPA was "a
congressional response to the Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Miller."3 The Act protects customer records maintained
by certain financial institutions from improper disclosure to
officials or agencies of the federal government." RFPA prohibits a
financial institution from disclosing records it holds to the federal
government without notification to the customer whose records are
being requested and requires a waiting period whereby the
customer has the opportunity to challenge the request through
legal action.32 RFPA is limited to disclosures to the federal
government, and does not reach requests for customer information
made by state or local governments or private parties.33 RFPA also
mandates that the government, among other requirements, provide
a covered financial institution a certificate of compliance with
RFPA before requested customer information may be released.34
There was little opposition to the legislation that would
become RFPA. The only significant opposition came from federal
law enforcement officials who were concerned that it would
impede federal authorities' investigations and prosecutions of
crimes, particularly white collar and organized crime.35
29 Pub. L. No. 95-630, Tit. XI, 92 Stat. 3641, §§ 3697-3710 (1978), codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2004).
30 95th Cong. 2d session, House Report No. 95-1383 (p. 34) (July 20, 1978); see
also Cong. Rec. Oct. 14, 1978 S.37,570 (remarks of M. Abourezk). "In the celebrated
Miller case, the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment prohibitions against
search and seizure did not protect bank records which were part of the daily business of
the bank .... The Court did not however, rule out a legislative remedy to this very large
hole in the constitutional privacy protections of individuals." Id.
31 See 12 U.S.C. § 3402.
32 See 12 U.S.C. § 3410.
33 See 12 U.S.C. § 3401.
34 See 12 U.S.C. § 3403(b).
35 See 124 Cong. Rec. H33,836-37 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
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C. 1996 Amendments to the FCRA
In 1996, the FCRA was amended to clarify various aspects of
the obligations of consumer reporting agencies and the uses of
consumer reports. Most significantly from a privacy standpoint,
the 1996 amendments expanded the ability for related entities to
share consumer reports among affiliates if it is clearly and
conspicuously disclosed to the consumer that the information may
be shared among affiliates and the consumer is given the
opportunity to opt out of affiliate sharing prior to such disclosure.
D. Know Your Customer Rule
While the issue of privacy of individual financial information
had been relatively quiet since the enactment of RFPA, a growing
concern over money laundering led federal bank regulatory
agencies in 1998 to take a step that was widely perceived by the
public as an attack on the privacy of financial information.
On December 7, 1998, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift
Supervision (the "Banking Agencies") published for public
comment the proposed "Know Your Customer Rule."36 The Know
Your Customer Rule was intended to implement 12 U.S.C.
1818(s).37 This statute requires the Banking Agencies to prescribe
regulations requiring depository institutions to establish and
maintain procedures reasonably designed to ensure and monitor
compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act.38 The Know Your
Customer Rule was designed to thwart illicit financial activities
that pose a serious threat to the integrity of financial institutions,
such as money laundering and fraud.39 The Know Your Customer
Rule was premised on the notion that when financial institutions
identify their customers and determine what transactions are
normal and expected for these customers, they can monitor
transactions to identify unusual or suspicious account activity.4 °
Cavanaugh).
36 63 Fed. Reg. 67,536 (proposed Dec. 7, 1998) (withdrawn Mar. 23, 1999).
37 See id.
38 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq.
39 See 63 Fed. Reg. 67,536.
40 See id.
2004]
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By identifying and reporting unusual or suspicious transactions,
financial institutions could protect their integrity and assist the
Banking Agencies and law enforcement authorities in stifling
illicit activities.4'
As proposed, the Know Your Customer Rule would have
required each bank to develop a program to determine the identity
of its customers; determine its customers' sources of funds;
determine, understand, and monitor the normal expected
transactions of its customers; and report any transaction of its
customer that appeared suspicious in accordance with the existing
suspicious activity report requirements.42 When the public
comment period for the regulation ended on March 8, 1999, the
Banking Agencies had received an unprecedented number of
comments (totaling over 250,000 to the FDIC alone43) on the
proposed rule from the public, banking organizations, industry
associations, and members of Congress. Of those comments
received, most of the comments voiced concern over the privacy
of information that would be collected and held by financial
institutions and many expressed concern about the added burden
on banks." As the opposition letter filed by the American
Bankers' Association stated:
The terminology used in this proposal clearly raises great
concern about privacy. Media reports have focused especially on
the profiling and monitoring wording, and privacy advocates have
expressed outrage that their local banker will be required to
analyze all customers' transactions. This growing public view has
so tainted the discussion of this regulation that assurances of
deletion of the profiling term will not be sufficient, we believe, to
41 See id.
42 In its present version, 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 requires national banks to report known
or suspected criminal offenses, at specified thresholds, or transactions aggregating
$5,000 or more if bank officers suspect the transactions involve money laundering or
violation of the Bank Secrecy Act.
43 See Hearing before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law (Mar.
4, 1999), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/106-39.htm (statement of Rep.
Barr, Member, House Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law).
44 Joint Statement, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of
Thrift Supervision, Proposed "Know Your Customer" Rule (Mar. 23, 1999), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/boardacts/1999/19990323/statement.HT
M.
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calm the public. This concern goes beyond the propriety of a
[Know Your Customer] proposal.45
Indeed, opposition was so strong that a bill was introduced in
the 106th Congress (HR10) to provide for the hault of the Know
Your Customer Rule.4 6 As then Representative Bob Barr (R-GA),
one of the chief proponents of the bill noted:
Essentially, these regulations propose requiring banks to
compile detailed information on the financial transactions of their
customers without any regard to whether those customers are
suspected of criminal wrongdoing. This information then becomes
your personal profile. If that profile simply indicates a recent
transaction is out of character, your bank is forced to report your
finances to the government.47
Barr continues "It is highly unlikely, even ludicrous, to assume
that profiling the salary deposits, ATM fees, and mortgage
payments of millions of Americans will have a significant impact
on the activities of criminals., 48 These regulations assume that
millions of law-abiding Americans are potential criminals, simply
because they have a checking account. Existing law already
provides more than adequate authority to fight money
laundering.49
In the Joint Press Release announcing the withdrawal of the
Know Your Customer Rule, Comptroller Hawke is quoted as
testifying before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee
on Commercial and Administrative law that, "I firmly believe that
any marginal advantages for law enforcement in this proposal
[Know Your Customer Rule] are strongly outweighed by its
45 Letter from Edward L. Yingling on behalf of the American Bankers' Association
to Banking Agencies (Jan. 28, 1999), available at http://www.aba.com/aba/
static/KYC_Commentltr.html (calling for the withdrawal of the proposed "Know Your
Customer" Rule) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
46 H.R. 10 100th Cong. § 191 (1999).
47 Oversight Hearing on "The 'Know Your Customer' Rules: Privacy in the Hands
of Federal Regulators" Before the House Com. and Admin. L. Subcomm., 106 th Cong.
(1999) (testimony of U.S. Rep. Bob Barr), available at http://www.house.gov/
judiciary/106-39.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
48 Id.
49 Id.
2004]
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potential for inflicting lasting damage on our banking system. 50
Even after the withdrawal of the proposed Know Your
Customer Rule, animosity still lingered. For example, the
American Civil Liberties Union launched a "Know Your Banker"
campaign which encouraged consumers to write a letter to their
banker requesting information about the bank's policies regarding
the privacy of consumer financial information.51
E. GLBA
The concern for financial privacy evidenced by the public
response to the Know Your Customer Rule appeared to continue
with adoption of the GLBA. The GLBA, which was signed into
law on November 12, 1999, contains the most comprehensive
federal financial privacy provisions ever enacted, requiring a
financial institution to protect the security, integrity, and
confidentiality of customer information. The privacy provisions
are found in Title V of the GLBA, which is broken down into two
subtitles: Subtitle A creates new substantive obligations relating to
the disclosure of customer information by financial institutions to
nonaffiliated third parties;52 Subtitle B establishes new federal
prohibitions relating to the fraudulent acquisition of customer
information from a financial institution.53 The GLBA affects an
extremely wide range of organizations. It applies to "financial
institutions" which means any entity "the business of which is
engaging in financial activities" as described in section 4(k) of the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956"4 which includes, among
others, banking institutions, insurance companies, and securities
firms.
50 Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller Says
"Know-Your-Customer" Rule Should be Rejected, OCC Release No. 99-17 (Mar. 4,
1999), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/99%2D17.txt (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
51 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial
Counties, ACLU Denounces Bank Spying; Urges Customers to "Know Your Banker,"
(may 10, 1999), available at http://www.aclusandiego.org/KNOWYOURBANKER.htm
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
52 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (1999).
53 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6821-6827 (1999).
54 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1956).
[Vol. 29
THE FEAR FACTOR
The GLBA only limits the disclosure of "nonpublic personal
information" which is defined as personally identifiable
information about a consumer or consumers and any list or
grouping of consumers created by using personally identifiable
information.55 Nonpublic personal information does not include
publicly available information. 6
The GLBA generally prohibits the disclosure of nonpublic
personal information about a consumer to nonaffiliated third
parties unless notice and opt-out is delivered to that consumer. 7
Notices must be provided to consumers initially and annually
thereafter to those consumers with whom a continued relationship
exists (customers).58 Notices must include the categories of
nonpublic personal information that a financial institution collects
and the categories that it discloses. 9 Notices must also identify
what categories of nonpublic personal information are disclosed to
affiliated and to nonaffiliated third parties.6" When a notice is
required, consumers must also be given the opportunity to opt-out
of the disclosures unless such disclosures are made within one of
the exceptions.6
Although considered by some as a significant advance in
privacy protection, the GLBA has been criticized for permitting
affiliate sharing and relying on an opt-in, instead of an opt-out for
non-affiliate sharing. Perhaps more significantly to the GLBA
opt-out is subject to a long list of exceptions." For example, no
notice is required for disclosures that are necessary to a transaction
requested or authorized by a consumer.63 No notice is required for
disclosures related to the servicing or processing of a financial
product requested or authorized by a consumer. 4 No notice is
required for disclosures made in connection with the maintenance
55 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4) (1999).
56 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4)(B) (1999).
57 15 U.S.C. § 6803 (1999).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (1999).
63 15 U.S.C. § 6902(e)(1) (1999).
64 Id.
2004]
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or service of a consumer account and disclosures may always be
made with a consumer's consent.65 In addition, financial
institutions need not provide opt-out for disclosures to
nonaffiliated third parties made in order to perform services for or
functions on behalf of the financial institution, or market the
financial institution's own products or services or the products or
services of the third party under a joint-marketing agreement.66
The net effect of the GLBA is that it serves primarily as a
limitation on the disclosure of information for marketing purposes.
F. USA PATRIOTAct
Before the dust had settled from the attacks on New York City
and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001 ("September 1 th"),
the public's outrage at the proposed Know Your Customer Rule by
the Banking Agencies and the concern that fostered the GLBA
requirements addressed more pressing concerns. In the wake of
the attacks of September 11 th, privacy advocates took a back seat
to the desire to use the financial system to detect and thwart
terrorism. As stated by the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment, "It takes money for weapons and explosives. It takes
money to get terrorists to their targets, and then into hiding. 67
Congress quickly responded by enacting the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA PATRIOT
Act")68 -passed in the wake of the September 1 1th terrorist
attacks. The stated purpose of the USA PARIOT Act is to enable
law enforcement officials to track down and punish those
responsible for the attacks and to protect against any similar
attacks.69 The USA PATRIOT Act grants federal officials greater
powers to trace and intercept terrorists' communications both for
65 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(1)(B) (1999).
66 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(1)(C)(2) (1999).
67 UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES FOR CONTROL OF MONEY LAUNDERING 121, OTA-ITC-630 (Washington,
D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, Sept. 1995).
68 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct.
26, 2001).
69 See id.
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law enforcement and foreign intelligence purposes.7" The USA
PATRIOT Act also expanded the authority of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and law enforcement to gain access to business
records, medical records, educational records, and library records,
including stored electronic data and communications.7 With
respect to financial information, the USA PATRIOT Act requires
financial institutions to take additional steps to Know Their
Customer by verifying their identity and provides the government
with more effective means to access that information.72
Treasury rules to implement Section 314 of the USA
PATRIOT Act allow a federal law enforcement agency
investigating terrorist activity or money laundering to request that
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN"), on the
agency's behalf, provide certain financial information from a
financial institution or group of financial institutions.73 FinCEN,
on behalf of the agency, may require a financial institution to
search its records to ascertain whether the financial institution
maintains or has maintained accounts for, or conducted
transactions with, the individual or entity specified.7 4 The rule sets
a floor for such inquiries whereby the requesting agency need only
certify that each individual or entity that is the subject of the
request is "engaged in, or is reasonably suspected based on
credible evidence of engaging in, terrorist activity."75 The
certification also must contain certain identification information.76
The information that must be reported back by the financial
institution, if a match is found in the financial institution's records,
is limited to the name or account number of each individual or
entity for which a match is found, a social security number and
date of birth, or other similar identifying information that was
provided by the subject of the information when the account was
70 CHARLES DOYLE, THE USA PATRIOT ACT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS, CRS Report
for Congress, Order Code RL 31377, at 1-2 (2002).
71 Id. at 1-2, 68.
72 Id. at 1-2.
73 Financial Record-Keeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions,
31 C.F.R. § 103.100 (2004).
74 Id. § 103.100(b)(1) (2004).
75 Id.
76 Id.
2004)
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opened or the transaction conducted.77 The rule further provides
that the RFPA shall not stand as an obstacle to responding to these
requests.78 Although the information to be provided in response to
these requests is limited to the Section 314 rules, it effectively
reinstates the Miller rule with respect to this information.
In addition, Section 326 of the USA PATRIOT Act added a
new subsection to 31 U.S.C. § 5318 of the Bank Secrecy Act.
This subsection requires that the regulations setting forth the
minimum standards for financial institutions79 and their customers
regarding the identity of the customer that apply in connection
with the opening of an account at a financial institution.8 ° Joint
Treasury and federal banking agency rules to implement Section
326 of the USA PATRIOT Act require financial institutions to
adopt reasonable procedures to "verify the identity of any person
seeking to open an account to the extent reasonable and
practicable, to maintain records of the information used to verify
the person's identity, and to determine whether the person appears
on any lists of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist
organizations provided to the financial institution by any
government agency.,
81
"Under the Section 326 rules, a bank must implement a written
customer identification program ("CIP") appropriate for the size
and type of business" 82of the bank. "The CIP must include risk-
based procedures to allow the bank to form a reasonable belief that
it knows the true identity of each of its customers. 83 Such
77 Id. § 103.100(b)(2)(ii) (2004).
78 Id. § 103.100(b)(2)(iv)(B)(3) (2004).
79 The Bank Secrecy Act broadly defines "financial institution" and includes a
variety of entities including: commercial banks; agencies and branches of foreign banks
in the United States; thrifts; credit unions; private banks; trust companies; investment
companies; brokers and dealers in securities; futures commission merchants; insurance
companies; travel agents; pawnbrokers; dealers in precious metals; check cashers;
casinos; and telegraph companies. See Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) and
(c)(1)(A) (2001).
80 68 Fed. Reg. 25090 (May 9, 2003).
81 Id.
82 Financial Recordkeeping and Recording of Currency and Foreign Transactions,
68 Fed. Reg. 25109 (May 9, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 121(b)(1)).
83 Financial Recordkeeping and Recording of Currency and Foreign Transactions,
68 Fed. Reg. 25109 (May 9, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 121(b)(2)).
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"procedures must be based on the bank's assessment of' the risks
related to the bank's business, including the types of accounts the
bank maintains, "methods of opening accounts" used by the bank,
"types of identifying information available, and the bank's size,
location, and customer base."84
At a minimum the following information is required from the
customer prior to opening an account: (1) name, (2) date of birth,
(3) address, which shall be the residential or business street
address of the individual, or an APO or FPO for an individual
without a residential or business street address, or the residential
or business street address of the next of kin or other contact; or for
a person other than an individual, a principal place of business,
local office or other physical location; and (4) an identification
number which shall be for a U.S. person a taxpayer identification
number, passport number and country of issuance, alien
identification number or number and country of issuance of any
other government-issued document that shows nationality or
residence and bearing a photograph or similar safeguard.85
While the FDIC alone received more than 250,000 negative
comments on the Know Your Customer Rule, Treasury and the
banking agencies collectively received approximately five hundred
comment letters in response to the USA PATRIOT Act proposed
rule.86 The comments on the proposed rule were largely from
industry members and associations and did not express the general
outrage that sprung from the Proposed Know Your Customer
Rule.87 Only a small number of comments were received from
individuals, and of those, only some criticized the rule as an
infringement upon individual liberty and privacy.88
G. The FACTAct
On December 4, 2003, President George W. Bush signed into
law the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003
84 Id.
85 Financial Recordkeeping and Recording of Currency and Foreign Transactions,
68 Fed. Reg. 25109 (May 9, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 121(b)(2)(i)(A)).
86 63 Fed. Reg. 25091.
87 Id.
88 Id.
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("FACT Act").89 The FACT Act permanently reauthorized the
national uniformity provisions of the FCRA.9° Other provisions of
the FACT Act were designed to assist both consumers and
financial institutions in the fight against identity theft.9' The FACT
Act was based on a recognition by Congress that the growth in
technology and the free flow of information was accompanied by
the burgeoning crime of identity theft. A number of the identity
theft provisions rely on the same type of customer identification
processes required under Section 326 of the USA PATRIOT Act.
For example, the FACT Act adds a new section 605A to the
FCRA, establishing three instances where consumers or military
personnel can direct a nationwide consumer reporting agency, as
defined under section 603(p) of the FCRA,92 to include a fraud
alert or an active duty alert in each consumer report fumished on
those consumers.93 The fraud alerts, provided for by the FACT
Act, are designed to clearly and conspicuously notify users of
consumer reports that the consumer may have been a victim of
identity theft or other fraud, or that the consumer is on active duty
in the military. Therefore, users are warned to verify the identity
of the consumer before establishing a new credit plan or loan
obligation or issuing an additional card when requested by a
consumer with an alert in his or her file.94 The legislative history
of this provision reflects that fraud alerts were designed
specifically to limit opportunities for criminals to harm consumers
in situations involving the use of a credit report and that the
provision was intended only to apply when a credit report is being
pulled to provide new credit or extend existing credit limits,
requested by consumers.95 The FACT Act requires a consumer
89 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-159, 117 Stat.
1952 (2003).
90 Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1681).
91 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-159, 117 Stat.
1952 (2003).
92 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681a(p) (2003).
93 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-159, 117 Stat.
1952 § 112(a), (2003) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681c-l(a)(1)(A)).
94 Id. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681c-l(h)(1)(A).
95 S. REP. No. 108-166, at 11 (2003).
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reporting agency to place a fraud alert96 on a consumer's credit file
consistent with the requirements of the FACT Act, when one is
requested by the consumer.97 This fraud alert provides all
prospective users of a consumer report on the consumer with a
warning that the consumer does not authorize the establishment of
any new credit plan or other new credit obligation in the
consumer's name, unless the user verifies the identity of the
person making the request in an appropriate manner.
98
The legislative history notes that what constitutes reasonable
verification standards intentionally was not described in detail,
with the expectation that users will consider various mechanisms,
including the verification requirements of section 326 of the USA
PATRIOT Act.99
Further, the FACT Act requires the Banking Agencies, the
National Credit Union Administration ("NCUA") and the FTC to
jointly establish procedures for the identification of possible
instances of identity theft - i.e., "red flag" guidelines and
regulations.1 °° The legislative history for this provision elucidates
that this requirement was expected to result in the development of
broad guidelines, thus resulting in policies and procedures that
vary from institution to institution.10 ' The legislative history
further explains that many institutions already have such policies
and procedures in place as a result of the new account verification
requirements of Section 326 of the USA PATRIOT Act 10 2 and the
FACT Act requires that the policies and procedures established
under the "red flag" guidelines shall not be inconsistent with the
policies and procedures required by Section 326 of the USA
PATRIOT Act.10 3
96 A fraud alert is defined as a statement in a consumer's file that the consumer
may be a victim of identity theft or other fraud. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681c-1(a)(1) (2003).
97 FACT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-159 § 112(a), 117 Stat. 1953 (2004) (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§1681c-l(a)-(b)).
98 FACT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-159 § 112(a), 117 Stat. 1953 (2004) (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-l(h)(1)(B)(i)).
99 H.R. REP. No. 108-263, at 40-41 (2003).
100 FACT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-159 § 114, 117 Stat. 1953 (2004) (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1681m(e)(1)(A)-(B)).
101 S. REP. No. 108-66, at 13 (2003).
102 Id.
103 FACT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-159 § 114, 117 Stat. 1953 (2004) (to be codified at
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While the FACT Act encourages financial institutions to know
their customers, it also addresses the perceived gap left by the
GLBA rules with respect to the affiliate sharing of information but
does so in a unique way by focusing on the use of the information
rather than its disclosure. The FACT Act adds a new section 624
to the FCRA which provides that an institution that receives either
experience information or consumer report information on a
consumer from an affiliate may not use such information for
marketing solicitation to the consumer about the institution's
products or services, unless the institution clearly and
conspicuously discloses to the consumer that information received
from affiliates may be used for marketing purposes and the
consumer is given an opportunity and method to opt out of
receiving such marketing solicitations."° The legislation clarifies
that this section does not limit the ability of affiliates to share
information, nor does it limit their ability to establish and maintain
a database of information shared by affiliates; rather, it only
requires notice of such sharing before the information is used to
send marketing solicitations." 5 Affiliates, however, are allowed to
share information without limitation, so long as it is not used for
marketing solicitations without first providing notice and opt-
out.' °6 Under this new section, the opt-out notice may be provided
to the consumer together with disclosures required by any other
provision of law, such as those required by GLBA.107
III. Conclusion
A fundamental right to privacy of financial information does
not exist in U.S. law. Where U.S. citizens are willing to have
defined the edges of their right to privacy defined, it is shaped not
by a fundamental right to privacy itself but by the strength of those
forces bearing down upon it. The proposed Know Your Customer
Rule was conceived at a time where the American people felt
comfortable in their homes; yet September 1 lth eroded that
15 U.S.C. § 1681(m)(e)(3)).
104 FACT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-159 § 214(a), 117 Stat. 1953 (2004) (to be codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-3(a)(1)).
105 149 CONG. REc. 176, at E2512 (Dec. 9, 2003).
106 Id.
107 15 U.S.C. §§ 6802-03 (2003).
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confidence. As a result, people's immediate concerns shifted from
fearing the state as a predator to wanting the state as protector.
Indeed, while the implementing regulations for the USA
PATRIOT Act were in many ways similar to the requirements of
the proposed Know Your Customer Rule, the USA PATRIOT Act
rule did not draw any significant opposition on privacy grounds.
The U.S framework for financial privacy is, and will be,
responsive to the external forces of the time. The United States
values the free flow of information, and the rewards that come
from it. For example, credit reporting enables people to pay rates
on credit that more accurately reflect the individual's credit risk,
rather than absorbing the cost to the financial institution of
offering credit to those who pose a greater credit risk. A recent
trend in consumer privacy can be seen in the FACT Act provision
that limits the uses of consumer information, rather than the
transfer of this information. This notion of limiting the use of the
information, rather than the flow, may signal a new approach to
privacy in a world that cannot deny the perpetual advancement of
information technology.
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